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Q43This paper investigates the relationship between oil prices, global industrial production, prices, central bank
policy interest rate andmonetary aggregate with a global factor-augmented error correction model. We conﬁrm
the following stylized relationships: i) at global level, money, industrial production and prices are cointegrated;
ii) positive innovation in global oil price is connected with global interest rate tightening; iii) positive innovation
in global money, price level and industrial production is connected with an increase in oil prices; iv) positive
innovations in global interest rate are associated with a decline in oil prices; and v) the U.S., Euro area and
China are the main drivers of global macroeconomic factors.






Since the mid-1990s several important changes have taken place in
the global economy and international oil market. With the creation of
the ECB in 1999 and the rapid economic growth of China and India,
the largest 5 economies (the Euro area, the U.S., China, Japan and
India) now account for around 65% of the world economy (measured
in purchase power parity), and global demand for oil in recent decades
has been driven by brisk growth in major developing economies.2 Im-
portant changes have also occurred in the global economy in terms ofhool of Economics and Finance,
Ratti),
es to strong growth forecasts in
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growth. Beirne et al. (2013) esti-
ﬁnd that China's GDP growth at-
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policy have a negative and per-
l. (2015) ﬁnd that US monetary
ices.
. This is an open access article undercentral bank actions. With many countries suffering prolonged
economic downturns and ofﬁcial/policy interest rates being close to
zero, after the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, the U.S., Japan, Euro area
and the U.K. central banks have turned to alternative policies to expand
monetary aggregates and hence stimulate the economy.
The literature generally analyses the relationship between the U.S.
federal funds rate and oil prices. However, in the current context we be-
lieve that central bank interest rates at global level and also global mon-
etary aggregates should be considered in interaction with oil prices,
particularly given the surge in the Chinese and Indian economies and
the new ways that central banks now seek to inﬂuence the economy.
The U.S. Energy Information Agency documents that China became
the world's largest net importer of oil on an annual basis in 2014. The
largest oil consuming countries in 2014 were the U.S., China, Japan
and India in that order. India has increased oil consumption by over
50% over 2000–2010. The surge in demand for oil by China and India
is forecasted by the IEA to continue well into the future.3
While growth in emerging economies has mattered primarily for the
latest surge in oil prices, more generally, this is about demand from all
countries in theworld. Barsky and Kilian (2004) emphasize that oil prices
are endogenous with respect to U.S. and global macroeconomic3 The IEA projects that “China, India, and theMiddle Eastwill account for 60% of a 30% in-
crease in global energy demand between now and 2035”… “By 2035, almost 90% ofMiddle
Eastern oil ﬂows to Asia” (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/pressmedia/quotes/12/).
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199R.A. Ratti, J.L. Vespignani / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 198–212conditions.4 It is also stressed that the behaviour of commodity prices is
closely intertwined with global monetary conditions. Barsky and Kilian
(2002) show that the global shifts in monetary policy regimes in the
1970s caused shifts in real economic growth and inﬂation and hence in
the real price of oil.5 Bodenstein et al. (2012) develop a DSGE model
and argue that causality runs from the oil market to monetary policy as
well as from changes in monetary policy to the supply and demand of
oil in global markets. Belke, Bordon and Hendricks (2010) ﬁnd that cau-
sality between global monetary aggregates and oil price runs both
ways. The literature is clear that when considering the world price for
oil it is necessary to consider the inﬂuence of global variables, including
thosewhich reﬂect the stance of monetary policy in themajor develop-
ing and developed countries.
We believe that this paper contributes to the literature by providing
stylized facts on the interaction between oil prices and factor-
augmented global macroeconomic variables, including aggregated
central bank policy interest rates and liquidity, by estimating a global fac-
tors vector error correction model (GFAVEC). A factor-augmented
dimension to the GFAVECmodelwill capture the dynamic of the informa-
tion provided by many variables to the analysis of short and long run in-
teraction of global oil price, global industrial production, global CPI and
global policy interest rate. Global factors are estimated using principal
component techniques applied to interest rates, industrial production
across countries, and CPI across countries, respectively.6 The use of factor
analysis for crude oil prices is appropriate for analysis of the behaviour of
the global economy since West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price
has diverged sharply fromBrent andDubai crudeoil prices in recent years.
Some stylized facts that emerge from our empirical analysis are:
i) Global money, global industrial production and global prices are
cointegrated.
ii) Granger causality goes from liquidity to oil prices and from oil
prices to the global interest rate, global industrial production
and global CPI.
iii) Positive innovations in world oil price are connected with
statistically signiﬁcant extended positive effects on global inter-
est rates and global industrial production.
iv) Positive innovation in the global interest rate is linked with a
persistent decline in global oil price.
v) Statistically signiﬁcant persistent increases in global oil price are
associated with positive shocks to global M2 and global industrial
production.
The methodology and global variables are described in Section 2.
Granger causality among the economic variable and global
macroeconomic variables is investigated in Section 3. The
GFAVEC model is presented in Section 4. The empirical results
are presented in Section 5. The robustness of results to alternative
deﬁnitions of the variables and different model speciﬁcations is
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.7 An alternative approach to the use of factorswould be to useweighted averages of the
different variables as deﬁnitions of the global variables. This approach brings the difﬁculty2. Data and global factors
2.1. Background
In this paper we estimate a global factor-augmented error correction
model. Factor methods have become widely used in the literature to4 Recent work on global inﬂuence on the price of oil include Kilian and Lee (2014) and
Kilian and Murphy (2014) investigating the roles of speculation and inventories in
inﬂuencing the price of oil.
5 Frankel (1986) in an early paper develops a model linking easier money supply with
higher commodity prices. Frankel and Rose (2010) do not ﬁnd empirical support for such
a relationship.
6 It is emphasized that this is not the same as the stance of global monetary policy since
there is no global central bank. In recent years the effect of global liquidity on the prices of
commodities has been emphasized by some researchers. Increases in liquidity raise aggre-
gate demand and thereby increase commodity prices.examine the co-movements of aggregate variables since work by Stock
and Watson (1998) and Forni et al. (2000). A number of issues have
been addressed recently using factor methods. Building on Stock and
Watson (2002), Bernanke et al. (2005) propose a factor-augmented
VAR (FAVAR) to identify monetary policy shocks. Mumtaz and Surico
(2009) extend Bernanke et al. (2005) to consider a FAVAR for an open
economy. A factor-augmented approach has been used by Dave et al.
(2013) to isolate the bank lending channel in monetary transmission of
U.S. monetary policy and by Gilchrist et al. (2009) to assess the impact
of credit market shocks on U.S. activity. Le Bihan and Matheron (2012)
use principal components to ﬁlter out sector-speciﬁc shocks to examine
the connection between the stickiness of prices and the persistence of in-
ﬂation. Boivin et al. (2009) assume that the connectionbetween the sticky
prices and monetary policy can be captured by ﬁve common factors esti-
mated by principal component analysis. Abdallah and Lastrapes (2013)
use a FAVAR model to examine house prices across states in the U.S.
Beckmannet al. (2014) examine the effect of global shocks onpolicymak-
ing for the US, Euro area, Japan, U.K. and Canada. Juvenal and Petrella
(2014) in an examination of the role of speculation in the oil market, con-
struct a factor for speculation based on a large number ofmacroeconomic
and ﬁnancial variables for the G7.
In line with the dynamic factor models of Bernanke et al. (2005),
Stock and Watson (2005), Forni and Gambetti (2010), and others, we
construct a global factor-augmented error correction model to examine
the relationships between oil prices, global interest rate, global mone-
tary aggregates, global industrial production and global CPI and the
weighted trade index of the U.S. dollar. A cointegrating vector for global
money, global industrial production and global price level is utilized.
The main advantage of this approach in a global setup is that it is
possible to compress data for many countries in single factor without
losing degrees of freedom, thereby allowing for the inﬂuence of both
large developed and developing economies.7 A single individual vari-
able or factor can capture the dynamic of a large amount of information
contained in many variables. Sims (2002) argues that when deciding
policy central banks consider a huge amount of data. Koop and
Korobilis (2009) provide an overview of factor-augmented VARs and
other models.2.2. The data
The data are monthly from January 1999 to December 2013. The
starting period coincides with the creation of the European Central
Bank, and data on CPI and interest rate for this block is only available
from January 1999. Monthly data is used to overcome the limitation of
few observations obtained from quarterly data over a 13-year period.
Data are obtained on the central bank discount rate, monetary aggre-
gate M2, consumer price index, and industrial production index for
each of the ﬁve largest economies consisting of the Euro area, the U.S.,
Japan, China and India. Oil prices are given by the Brent, Dubai and
WTI U.S. dollar international indexes for crude oil prices. The trade
weighted index for the U.S. dollar completes the data.8 Data on each
country are from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED data) and data
on oil prices are from the World Bank.of choice of weights, particularly for monthly data. Use of industrial production, for exam-
ple, raises problems in that the service sectors of the developed economies are so much
greater than that of the emerging economies and industrial production is subject to wide
swings. The advantage of using principal components is that results depend on an algo-
rithm focusing on the common components in the data and not by the weights selected
by the authors.
8 We use the U.S. TWI to capture exchange rate ﬂuctuation given that the U.S. dollar is the
currencymost commonly used for trade and savingworldwide.Major currencies index from
the Federal Reserve Systemof theUnited State includes: the EuroArea, Canada, Japan, United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and Sweden. Weights are discuss in: http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/winter05_index.pdf.
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dollars), CPI and industrial production for the U.S., Euro area, China,
India, and Japan over 1999:01–2013:12 are shown in Fig. 1. The central
bank discount rate for each of the ﬁve economies has varied over time.
Although at widely different levels, the interest rates all show declines
following the March–November 2001 recession in the US. With the ex-
ception of India, central bank discount rate register increases during the
commodity price boom over 2005–2008 and fall during the global ﬁ-
nancial crises. Liquidity (M2 in U.S. dollar) increases over the fourteen
years from 1999:01 to 2013:12 by approximately a factor of 12 in
China, 4.8 in India, 2.3 in the U.S., 2.6 in Euro area, and by 2 in Japan.
The consumer price level is up by a factor of 1.34 in China, 2.4 in
India, 1.4 in the U.S., 1.35 in Euro area, and down by 4% in Japan. Com-
pared to the U.S., the Euro area and Japan, China and India have grown
much faster in recent years. For example, over the fourteen years from
1999:01 to 2013:12 industrial production is up approximately by fac-
tors of about 2.9 and 2.3 in China and India respectively, and up by
only about 14% and 6% in the U.S. and the Euro area respectively, and
down by about 3% in Japan. On the basis of GDP in purchasing power
parity in 2013 (in declining order) the U.S., Euro area, China, India,
and Japan, are by far and away the largest economies in the world.
2.3. The global factors
Principal components indexes are constructed for each group of
variables for the ﬁve economies and are the global interest rate (GIRt),
global CPI (GCPIt) and global industrial production (GIPt).9 A global
monetary aggregate M2 (GM2t), the sum of M2 monetary aggregates
across economies (in U.S. dollars) captures the effect of liquidity. Global
oil prices (GOP) is constructed by using a unique principal component
index based on information for the Brent, Dubai and WTI U.S. dollar-
based international indexes for crude oil prices.
The indicators of global interest rates, global industrial production
and of global CPI are the leading principal components for interest
rates, industrial production and CPI (in log-level form for industrial
production and CPI) of the U.S., Euro area, China, India, and Japan.
These are given by
GIRt ¼ IREat ; IRUSt ; IRCht ; IR Jat ; IRInt
h i
; ð1Þ
GIPt ¼ IPEat ; IPUSt ; IPCht ; IP Jat ; IPInt
h i
; ð2Þ
GCPIt ¼ CPIEat ;CPIUSt ;CPICht ;CPI Jat ;CPIInt
h i
; ð3Þ
where the superscripts for the variables GIRt, GIPt and GCPIt: Ea, US, Ch, Ja,
and In, represent the Euro area, U.S., China, Japan, and India respectively in
Eqs. (1), (2) and (3). In Eq. (1),GIRt is a vector containing the discount rate
of the central banks of the Euro area, U.S., China, Japan and India.10
Eqs. (2) and (3) are vectors containing the industrial production and
CPI for the same economies respectively.119 Note that the ﬁrst and second principal components of these series are less than 100%
representative of the original variables.
10 Structural factors in VARmodels to better identify the effects of monetary policy have
appeared in a number of contributions (for example, by Belviso andMilani (2006); Laganà
(2009) and Kim and Taylor (2012), among others), but less so in work on commodity
prices. An exception is by Lombardi et al. (2012) examining global commodity cycles in
a FAVAR model in which factors represent common trends in metals and food prices.
11 The ﬁrst principal component for country CPIs to indicate global inﬂation is similar to
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2009) method of identifying global inﬂation based on price indices
for 22OECDcountries and a factormodelwith ﬁxed coefﬁcients.Within the factor analysis
framework, a different approach is taken byMumtaz and Surico (2012)whoderive factors
representing global inﬂation from a panel of 164 inﬂation indicators for the G7 and three
other countries.The indicator for global oil prices is the leading principal component
of the Dubai, Brent and WTI oil prices and is given by
GOPt ¼ OPDubait ;OPWTIt ;OPBrentt
h i
: ð4Þ
A global factor for oil price better capturesmovement in oil price rel-
evant for the global economy than the individual prices for Brent, Dubai
andWTI oil. U.S. dollar indexes for Brent, Dubai andWTI crude oil prices
are shown in Fig. 2. Before the global ﬁnancial crisis, theWTI and Brent
crude oil prices were within a couple of dollars of each other, with WTI
usually at a premium relative to Brent. Since 2011, WTI has traded at a
signiﬁcant discount to Brent and on September 21, 2011, the discount
achieved $28.49 per barrel. The price gap between Brent and Dubai
also ﬂuctuates. Before 2011, Brent crude oil typically traded at a one
or two dollar premium relative to Dubai crude oil. The premium for
Brent over Dubai surged to $7.60 per barrel in 2011 with the crisis in
Libya, before falling to a low of $1.1 per barrel in November 2012, and
surging again to almost $6 per barrel in August 2013. Movement in
these price gaps reﬂect changes in the market conditions in various
parts of the world driven by economic and political considerations.12
We use one factor (the principal component) each for the global in-
terest rate, global industrial production, global CPI, and global oil price
to keep the total number of variables in the estimation of the global
relationship to a minimum. In an Appendix it is shown that, the ﬁrst
principal component for each variable captures much of the variation
in each variable across the ﬁve economies (for the interest rate, 44.5%,
for industrial production, 60%, and for CPI, 89.6%) and the three oil
price indices (99.6%).
In constructing principal components in the basicmodel we use nor-
malise loadings. With the normalise loading option, more weight is
given to variables (country variables in this case) with higher standard
deviation. With scores options all the variables are given equal weight
(by standardising them). A direct implication of choosing normalise
loading is that more weight is given to the variables for developing
economies, which generally have higher standard deviation in this
sample. This is a desirable feature of the analysis, given the views of
Hamilton (2009, 2013), and Kilian and Hicks (2013) that for the period
of analysis oil prices are largely inﬂuenced by the surge in growth in
developing economies.
The ﬁrst principal component for the global interest rate is drawn in
Fig. 3a for normalise loadings, normalise scores, and with equal weight-
ed scores and loadings (information on different loadings is provided in
the Appendix). Fig. 3a captures the fall in interest rates at the end of
2008 with the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis as well as the fall in in-
terest rates during and following the 2001 recession in the US. The ﬁrst
principal component for the CPI indices in Fig. 3b slopes upward. The
slight concavity in the curve over 2000–2006 indicates higher CPI over
this period followed by an overall ﬂat rate of inﬂation in the last half
of the sample.
The ﬁrst principal component for global industrial production is rep-
resented in Fig. 3c. Global industrial production has an upward trend
until the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. There is a severe correction in
GIPt in 2008–2009, reﬂecting the global ﬁnancial crisis, with recovery
of global industrial production to early 2008 levels only in 2011. Global
industrial production also shows a correction in 2001, coinciding with
the March–November 2001 recession in the U.S. The principal compo-
nent for crude oil prices is shown in Fig. 3d. Oil price rose sharply
from January 2007 to June 2008. Concurrent with the global ﬁnancial
crisis and the weak global economy, the oil price fell steeply until12 WTI represents the price oil producers receive in the U.S. and Brent and Dubai repre-
sents theprices received internationally. TheWTI andBrent crude oils share a similar qual-
ity and Dubai has higher sulphur. The recent negative premium forWTI relative to Brent is
usually explained in terms of oil production in the US exceeding cheap transportation ca-
pacity by pipeline to reﬁners on the US Gulf Coast. Fluctuation in the premium for Brent
over Dubai is usually tied to political events in North Africa and the Middle East.
13 With regard to monetary policy, Kim (2001) and Canova (2005) ﬁnd that monetary
expansion in the U.S. causes economic expansion in the non-US G-6 and in Latin
America by lowering interest rates across these economies.
Fig. 1.Macroeconomic economy-level variables. Notes: Central bank discount rates, M2monetary aggregates, consumer price indices, and industrial production indices are for each of the
ﬁve largest economies (the G5). The G5 consists of the U.S., the Euro area, Japan, China and India. Interest rates are in per cent. Log of M2 data in U.S. dollars is shown. Logs of industrial
production and the CPI are also shown. Data are monthly.
Fig. 2. U.S. dollar indexes for Brent, Dubai and WTI crude oil prices. Notes: Brent, Dubai and WTI crude oil prices are U.S. dollar indices. Data are monthly.
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The log of the trade weighted index of the U.S. dollar is shown in
Fig. 3e. The trade weighted U.S. dollar peaks in early 2002 and then
shows a gradual downward movement with a levelling off in recent
years. The log of globalM2 is shown in Fig. 3f and shows anupward trend.
Information on the correlations between country-speciﬁc and the
corresponding global variable for M2, short-term interest rate, industri-
al production and CPI are reported in the columns in Table 1. The global
interest rate correlation with country interest rates is high for the Euro
area, China and Japan (over 75% for each), 54% for the U.S. and only
29% for India. The global industrial production correlation with
country-level industrial production is high for the U.S. and India
(88% each), and 71%, 65% and 63% for Japan, Euro area and China,
respectively, in terms of log levels. The correlations of log ﬁrst-
differences of the data on output are smaller for the U.S., China and
India, but slightly larger for the Euro area and Japan. The global CPI con-
nection with that of each country-level CPI is high with correlations at
82% and above. The correlations of log ﬁrst-differences of the data on
prices for each country with global CPI inﬂation are quite different
than the correlations of log levels of the data on prices. The global M2
is highly correlated with M2 in each of the ﬁve economies in terms of
log levels. The correlations of log ﬁrst-differences of the data on M2
are much smaller, especially for the U.S., China and India. In analysis in
the Appendix, the log differences of the variables are stationary.3. Causality test
We now examine the direction of causality between the variables
at global level and also the causality between the developed and
developing large economies and the variables at global level. The issue
of causality between global variables and global oil price is not usually
addressed in the literature, but is clearly of interest given the increased
interconnectedness of the world economy. Work on the impact of a
large economy on other economies has naturally focused on the role
of the U.S. in the international transmission of shocks.13 China and
India are now large economies and their impact on global variables
needs to be examined along with that of the U.S., Euro area and Japan.
3.1. Directional inﬂuence among global variables
In Table 2, theGranger causality direction results for the global inter-
est rate, global M2, global industrial production and global CPI with
global oil price are presented. The balance of the evidence is that global
oil price Granger causes global interest rate, global industrial production
Fig. 3. Global variables (principal components). Notes: The leading principal components for global interest rates, global industrial production and global CPI (in log-level form for
industrial production and CPI) are each obtained fromdata on central bank interest rate, industrial production and CPI for the U.S., Euro area, China, India, and Japan. The leading principal
component for oil price is obtained from data on the Dubai, Brent andWTI oil prices. Alternative principal components are shown for normalise loadings, normalise scores andwith equal
weighted scores and loadings. TWIU.S. dollar is the log of the tradeweighted index of theU.S. dollar. Global liquidity is the log of globalM2which is the sum inU.S. dollars ofM2 for theU.S.,
Euro area, China, India, and Japan.
Table 1
Correlations of country and global data on each variable.
Country Global M2 Global interest rate Global output Global CPI
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plement the large literature assigning oil price shock a major role in
inﬂuencing real activity in individual economies by suggesting that
even global variables are inﬂuenced by oil prices. Hamilton's (1983) in-
ﬂuential paper on the effect of oil prices on the U.S. economy over the
post-World War II period treated oil price changes as exogenous. This
supposition was maintained by Lee et al. (1995), Hamilton (1996) and
Bernanke et al. (1997), among many others, who documented a
negative connection between oil price increases and real activity in
the US.14 Hamilton (2009) also distinguishes oil price shocks due to
demand and supply side inﬂuences.
It is found in Table 2 that global oil price does not Granger cause
global M2, but global M2 does Granger cause global oil price. This lat-
ter result is in line with the literature documenting a positive effect
of global liquidity on commodity prices. Belke, Orth and Setzer
(2010) ﬁnd that global liquidity has a signiﬁcant impact on commod-
ity prices, and Ratti and Vespignani (2013) show that increases in
global real M2 have led to statistically signiﬁcant increases in real
oil prices in recent years. Overall, we conclude that Granger causality
goes from liquidity to oil prices and from oil prices to the global in-
terest rate, global industrial production and global CPI.14 A signiﬁcant negative association between oil price shocks and economic activity has
been found for most countries in their samples by Cologni andManera (2008) for the G-7,
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) for G-7 and Norway, and Cunado and Perez de
Garcia (2005) for Asian countries.3.2. Which economies drive global variables?
With the upward surge of large developing economies such as China
and India, and the creation of the Euro area in January 1999, a natural
question arises: which economies drive the global economy? In
Table 3a, results for Granger causality test between global interest rate
and country-speciﬁc interest rates are shown. Similarly, in Tables 3b,
3c and 3d results are presented for the Granger causality test between
global M2, global industrial production and global CPI and correspond-
ing country-speciﬁc variables.
In Table 3a it is found that the interest rate in China Granger causes
the global interest rate and vice versa at all lag lengths. This result is
consistent with the view that China has become a major force in the
world economy. There is also evidence that interest rates in the U.S.,
Euro area and Japan Granger cause the global interest rate and vice
versa, depending on lag length. The interest rate in India and the global
interest rate do not inﬂuence each other.Euro area 0.96 (0.83) 0.76 0.65 (0.73) 0.96 (−0.11)
U.S. 0.99 (0.11) 0.54 0.88 (0.56) 0.95 (−0.003)
China 0.99 (0.24) 0.76 0.63 (0.25) 0.86 (0.19)
Japan 0.93 (0.69) 0.77 0.71 (0.73) 0.82 (−0.68)
India 0.97 (0.21) 0.29 0.88 (0.16) 0.89 (−0.13)
Notes: Correlations are of logs (and in brackets of log ﬁrst-differences) of country and
global values for M2, output and consumer price index. The interest rate is in percent.
Table 3a
Granger causality tests for global interest rate and country-speciﬁc interest rates: 1999:1–
2013:12 (log-level).
Granger test/lags 1 3 6 12 24
USIR does not Granger cause GIR 12.7*** 7.78*** 5.54*** 2.91*** 1.42
GIR does not Granger cause USIR 33.02*** 4.82*** 2.55*** 1.21 0.97
EAIR does not Granger cause GIR 4.27*** 5.69*** 2.79*** 1.10 0.97
GIR does not Granger cause EAIR 6.00*** 2.39* 4.47 1.37 1.81***
CHIR does not Granger cause GIR 14.23*** 9.24*** 3.80*** 3.24*** 2.26***
GIR does not Granger cause CHIR 7.17*** 4.81*** 3.12*** 3.24*** 1.79***
INIR does not Granger cause GIR 0.39 0.44 0.52 0.35 0.48
GIR does not Granger cause INIR 0.15 0.33 0.18 0.30 0.36
JIR does not Granger cause GIR 0.84 0.57 0.89 2.36*** 1.57*
GIR does not Granger cause JIR 1.99 3.13*** 1.56 1.49 1.25
Notes: Variables are global interest rate (GIR), U.S. interest rate (USIR), Euro Area interest
rate (EAIR), China interest rate (CHIR), India interest rate (INIR), and Japan interest rate
(JIR). ***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signif-
icance, respectively.
Table 3c
Granger causality tests for global industrial production and country-speciﬁc industrial
production: 1999:1–2013:12 (log-level).
Granger test/lags 1 3 6 12 24
USIP does not Granger cause GIP 0.29 2.02 5.39*** 3.55*** 2.27***
GIP does not Granger cause USIP 0.84 6.34*** 3.07*** 2.17** 1.51*
EAIP does not Granger cause GIP 1.87 2.88** 5.40*** 3.57*** 2.28***
GIP does not Granger cause EAIP 1.58 4.05*** 1.34 2.07** 1.44
CHIP does not Granger cause GIP 0.01 4.66*** 1.95* 1.28 1.40
GIP does not Granger cause CHIP 21.66*** 1.37 0.99 1.51 1.57*
INIP does not Granger cause GIP 0.02 4.32*** 2.21* 1.48 1.26
GIP does not Granger cause INIP 0.18 2.47* 1.68 1.11 1.32
JIP does not Granger cause GIP 2.29 3.24*** 1.14 0.96 0.70
GIP does not Granger cause JIP 0.21 2.95*** 2.52** 1.97** 1.62*
Notes: Variables are global industrial production (GIP), U.S. industrial production (USIP),
Euro Area industrial production (EAIP), China industrial production (CHY), India industrial
production (INIP), and Japan industrial production (JIP). ***, **, and * indicate rejection of
the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
Table 3d
Granger causality tests for global price level and country-speciﬁc price level: 1999:1–
2013:12 (log-level).
Granger test/lags 1 3 6 12 24
USCPI does not Granger cause GCPI 3.06** 1.37 1.97 2.21** 1.00
GCPI does not Granger cause USCPI 1.74 1.70 0.68 1.26 1.20
EACPI does not Granger cause GCPI 2.94* 1.89 4.09*** 2.25*** 1.39*
GCPI does not Granger cause EACPI 3.33* 1.04 1.79 2.28*** 2.24
CHCPI does not Granger cause GCPI 1.24 1.00 5.29*** 6.75*** 1.95**
GCPI does not Granger cause CHCPI 4.43** 12.60*** 13.46*** 4.28*** 1.83**
INCPI does not Granger cause GCPI 3.56* 1.23 5.23*** 4.13*** 1.23
GCPI does not Granger cause INCPI 0.13 1.37 0.86 1.45 0.24
JCPI does not Granger cause GCPI 1.42 0.60 1.22 0.91 1.07
GCPI does not Granger cause JCPI 2.37 2.46* 1.65 1.80* 1.35
Notes: Variables are global price level (GCPI), U.S. price level (USCPI), Euro Area price level
(EACPI), China price level (CHCPI), India price level (INCPI), and Japan price level (JCPI).
***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signiﬁcance,
respectively.
Table 2
Granger causality tests for global oil price and global variables: 1999:1–2013:12
(log-level).
Granger test/lags 1 3 6 12 24
GOP does not Granger cause GIR 2.78*** 2.17* 3.57*** 2.51*** 1.79**
GIR does not Granger cause GOP 0.70 0.87 0.69 1.34 1.56*
GOP does not Granger cause GM2 0.01 0.39 1.85* 1.22 0.79
GM2 does not Granger GOP 6.83*** 3.46*** 2.18** 1.82* 0.94
GOP does not Granger cause GIP 1.51 8.33*** 5.99*** 3.20*** 2.13***
GIP does not Granger cause GOP 0.23 1.98 1.06 1.50 0.81
GOP does not Granger cause GCPI 1.99 2.14* 1.40 2.45*** 1.85**
GCPI does not Granger cause GOP 0.66 2.13* 1.32 1.53 1.12
Notes: Variables are global oil price (GOP), global interest rate (GIR), global M2 (GM2),
global industrial production (GIP), and global price level (GCPI). ***, **, and * indicate re-
jection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
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China, Japan and theUS. Only Japan'sM2Granger causes globalM2. Glob-
al industrial production is driven by industrial production in all ﬁve econ-
omies (with the U.S. and Euro area having stronger results). Global
industrial production Granger causes industrial production in the U.S.,
Euro area, China and Japan. Global inﬂation is driven by inﬂation in the
U.S., Euro area, China and India, but not by inﬂation in Japan. Inﬂation
in China and the Euro area is Granger caused by global inﬂation.
In summary, the results indicate that the U.S. and China have most
breadth of inﬂuence across the global variables for interest rate, liquidity,
and industrial production and consumer prices. It is found that in terms of
Granger causality the U.S. and China inﬂuence the global interest rate,
global M2, global industrial production and global CPI. The Euro area in-
ﬂuences the global interest rate, global industrial production and global
CPI (but not global M2). Japan inﬂuences global M2 and global industrial
production (but not the global interest rate and global CPI). IndiaTable 3b
Granger causality tests for global M2 and country-speciﬁc M2: 1999:1–2013:12
(log-level).
Granger test/lags 1 3 6 12 24
USM2 does not Granger cause GM2 7.98*** 3.58*** 2.32** 2.25** 1.92**
GM2 does not Granger cause USM2 0.06 1.31 0.63 0.62 0.85
EAM2 does not Granger cause GM2 0.34 1.11 1.23 0.90 0.95
GM2 does not Granger cause EAM2 0.00 1.47 1.13 1.20 1.30
CHM2 does not Granger cause GM2 7.41*** 2.42* 1.17 1.17 1.44
GM2 does not Granger cause CHM2 0.97 0.49 0.82 0.81 1.10
INM2 does not Granger cause GM2 3.46* 1.10 1.63 1.30 0.81
GM2 does not Granger cause INM2 0.75 1.83 1.07 1.36 1.17
JM2 does not Granger cause GM2 5.73*** 5.20*** 2.94*** 2.07** 1.10
GM2 does not Granger cause JM2 5.17*** 4.59*** 2.15* 1.63* 1.48*
Notes: Variables are global M2 (GM2), U.S. M2 (USM2), Euro Area M2 (EAM2), China M2
(CHM2), India M2 (INM2), and Japan M2 (JM2). ***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null
hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.inﬂuences global industrial production and global CPI (but not global in-
terest rate and global M2), suggesting that India is most divorced from
the global economy at least in terms of the ﬁnancial variables (GIR and
GM2). All ﬁve economies inﬂuence global industrial production. The re-
sults indicate a degree of interdependence between China and the global
economy that is similar to levels of interdependence between the global
economy and either the U.S., Euro area, or Japan.
4. The model
The GFAVEC model can expressed as:
B0Xt ¼ β þ
X j
i¼1BiXt−i þ ςBreakt þ φECT1t−1 þ εt ð5Þ
where j is an optimal lag length, determined by the Schwarz criterion
(three lags in this case), Xt is an n × 1 vector of endogenous variables,
ECTt is an n × 1 vector of error correction terms (explained below), and
Breakt is an n × 1 vector of dummy variables taking the value of 1 from
2008:M9 to 2008:12 and zero otherwise (as explained in the following
section). B0 is an n × n matrix of identifying restrictions, Bi, i=1,… , j,
are n × n matrices of coefﬁcients, ς is an n × 1 vector of coefﬁcients
capturing change over the global ﬁnancial crisis,φ is an n×1 vector of co-
efﬁcients indicating speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium, and εt is
a random variable assumed to be independent of the variables on the
right hand side of Eq. (5).1515 Pesaran et al. (2004) develop an error-correcting global VAR (GVAR) framework for
globalmacroeconomicmodelling. TheGVAR combinesmodels for each economywith for-
eign variables external to a domestic economy constructed on a trade-weighted basis.
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Xt ¼ GIRt ;Δ log GM2tð Þ; log GCPItð Þ;Δ log GIPtð Þ;Δ log GOPtð Þ;Δ log USTWItð Þ½ :
ð6Þ
The endogenous variables in Eq. (6) are the global interest rate, global
monetary aggregate, global consumer price level, global industrial pro-
duction, oil price, and trade weighted U.S. dollar. For these global vari-
ables there is not a strong prior belief on variable order and concurrent
restrictions. Country-speciﬁc analyses by Leeper and Zha (2003), Sims
and Zha (2006a, 2006b), Sousa (2010, 2014) and others, identify a mon-
etary policy rule equation within SVARmodels founded on theory or the
expected time of the central bank reaction to information being available.
For example, a country-speciﬁc central bank is assumed to perceive inﬂa-
tion when inﬂation indicators are released and to react accordingly.
Whether the global interest rate, capturing developed and developing
country ofﬁcial interest rates, responds to global variables in the same
way is not clear.
Our baseline analysis of the model in Eqs. (1)–(6) uses generalized
cumulative impulse responses (GIRFs) on the grounds that contempo-
raneous restrictions for global variables are not established in the
literature. Garratt et al. (2006) and Dees et al. (2007), in analysis of
global systems, argue that generalized impulse response functions
(GIRFs) can provide useful information on the dynamics of the trans-
mission of shocks in vector autoregressive systems. Generalized im-
pulse response analysis, developed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran
and Shin (1998), is invariant to the ordering of the variables and
coincides with a Cholesky decomposition when the variable shocked
is ordered ﬁrst and does not react contemporaneously to any other var-
iable in the system. In extensive robustness analysis of the GIRF results,
we obtain and report outcomes from a structural model for the global
economy that mimics country-speciﬁc models.
4.1. The long run relationship amongmoney, prices and industrial production
at global level
We investigate whether a long run relationship applies to the global
variables of industrial production, consumer prices and money.16 Our
empirical analysis shows that an equilibrium relationship holds
between these variables and that global money has a role to play in
inﬂuencing global industrial production andprices. A cointegration rela-
tionship among global money, global industrial production and global
prices is found to exist.17 The error correction term in Eq. (1) is given by:
ECTt ¼ log GCPItð Þ−α−θ log GIPtð Þ−δ log GM2tð Þ  I 0ð Þ: ð7Þ
Results for test of cointegration among globalmoney, global industrial
production and global prices are presented in Table 4. Table 4a reports
that the Johansen cointegration test points to a unique cointegration vec-
tor when no trend and intercept is used and when trend and intercept is
used. Following the literature, we speciﬁed the error correction term
using intercept and trend. In Table 4b, the trace cointegration test reveals
that the null hypothesis of the number of cointegration vectors is less or
equal to r is rejected when r = 0 at 1% level, while either the hypothesis
of r ⩽ 1 and r ⩽ 2 cannot be rejected even at 20% level. In the maximum
eigenvalue test in Table 4c, the null hypothesis that the number of the
cointegrating vector is r can only be rejected when r = 0, while the hy-
potheses of either r = 1 and r = 2 cannot be rejected even at 15% level.16 Examples of investigations of cointegration (based on work by Engle and Granger
(1987)) between price level, monetary aggregate and industrial production for the US
are provided by Swanson (1998); Bachmeier and Swanson (2005); Garratt et al. (2009);
Browne and Cronin (2010), and others.
17 Note that the coefﬁcients for the estimated ECT for the G5 and G8 economies are:
log(GCPIt)=−48.19+0.051log(GIPt)+5.19log(GM2t) and log(GCPIt)=−1.85+
0.388log(GIPt)+0.016log(GM2t), respectively. Note that all coefﬁcients are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at least at 5% and signs are consistent with economic theory.4.2. Structural break and the global ﬁnancial crisis
Fig. 3 shows a large drop in global interest rates from2008:M9, during
the period of the globalﬁnancial crisis. Consequently, several dummyvar-
iables are introduced into themodel to capture a possible structural break
and are tested in this section. In Table 5, results from the log likelihood
ratio test (LR) are presented, evaluating the model in Eqs. (5)–(7) with
different dummy variables. We test dummy variables for 3 periods.
First, a dummy variable to capture change in relationships between vari-
ables during themost intense period of the global ﬁnancial crisis, dummy
variable from2008:09 to 2008:12, is introduced. Second, to test for the ef-
fect of change in the relationships between variables connected to possi-
ble systematic change in monetary policy during and after the global
ﬁnancial crises, a dummy variable is introduced from 2009:01 to the
end of the sample. Thirdly, to capture the effects of both the ﬁrst two
dummy variables, a dummy variable is introduced from 2008:09 to the
end of the sample. This dummy variable captures systematic change
that started immediatelywith the initial shock of the globalﬁnancial crisis
and continues beyond the crisis through to the present.
Results in Table 5, shows that LR test rejects the null hypothesis of no
structural break at 1% signiﬁcant level for the dummy variable from the
period 2008:09 to 2008:12 (the chi-square value is 39.66). The null
hypothesis of no structural break for the dummy variables from the
periods 2008:09 to 2013:12 and from 2009:01 to 2013:12 cannot be
rejected. In line with these results, we include a dummy variable, value
1 over 2008:09 to 2008:12 and 0 otherwise, in the model in Eqs. (5) to
(7).
5. Empirical results
The generalized cumulative impulse responses of variables in the
GFAVEC model (in Eqs. (5), (6) and (7)) to one-standard deviation
structural innovations are shown in Fig. 4. The dashed lines represent
a one standard error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the coef-
ﬁcients of the impulse response functions.18 Theﬁrst row in Fig. 4 shows
the response of the global interest rate to structural innovations in the
global interest rate, global M2, global CPI, global industrial production,
oil price, and the trade weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate, in turn. Sim-
ilarly, the second, third, fourth, ﬁfth and sixth rows show the response
of global M2, global CPI, global industrial production, oil price, and the
tradeweighted US dollar exchange rate, respectively, to structural inno-
vations in GIRt, Δ log(GM2t), Δ log(GCPIt), in Δ log(GIPt), Δ log(GOPt),
and Δ log(USTWIt) in turn.
5.1. Response of global interest rate to structural shocks
It is not clear from the literature what the effects on global interest
rates should be from structural shocks to the global variables. The
countries in the G5 have different exchange rate regimes, capital
controls and monetary policies. There is no global central bank and
the global interest represents the ﬁrst principal component of the data
on the discount rates of the G5.
In the ﬁrst row of Fig. 4, a positive shock to global M2 is associated
with a rising global interest rate over time. This result is consistent
with Thornton's (2014) observation that a liquidity effect is not ob-
served at country level. Also in the ﬁrst row of Fig. 4, positive shocks
to global CPI, to global industrial production, and to oil price lead to sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and persistent increases in the global interest rate
(in the third through ﬁfth diagrams in row 1).19 The results indicate18 The conﬁdence bands are obtained usingMonte Carlo integration as described by Sims
(1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR
coefﬁcient.
19 Consistent with this ﬁnding, Mallick and Sousa (2013) report that commodity price
shocks can result in an aggressive response from BRIC central banks concernedwith inﬂa-
tion stabilisation.
Table 4
Cointegration test: logs of global CPI (GCPI), global money (GM2) and global industrial production (GIP).
a) Cointegration test with different speciﬁcations
Endogenous variables: log(global CPIt), log(global M2t), log(global industrial production)
Test type None trend and intercept Linear trend and intercept
Trace 1 1
Max-Eig 1 1
Notes: *Critical values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). **Selected (0.05 level*) number of cointegrating relations by model.
b) Unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace)
Null hypothesis: the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r
Alternative hypothesis: there are more than r cointegrating vectors




r = 0 r ≥ 1 0.19 45.5 29.79 0.00
r ≤ 1 r ≥ 2 0.05 9.94 15.49 0.28
r ≤ 2 r ≥ 3 0.00 0.24 3.94 0.62
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
c) Unrestricted cointegration rank test (maximum eigenvalue)
Null hypothesis: the number of cointegrating vectors is r
Alternative hypothesis: there are (r + 1) cointegrating vectors




r = 0 r = 1 0.22 60.83 42.9 0.00
r = 1 r = 2 0.07 20.9 25.88 0.18
r = 2 r = 3 0.04 7.94 12.52 0.25
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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indicated by a rise in the global interest rate, when global level liquidity
is increasing, the economy is heatingup in terms of rising industrial pro-
duction and prices, and oil prices are rising.
A positive shock to the tradeweighted value of the U.S. dollar results
in a signiﬁcant decline in the global interest rate (in the sixth diagram in
row 1 of Fig. 4). This result is in harmony with Shin's (2014) reasoning
that a stronger U.S. dollar constitutes a tightening of global ﬁnancial
conditions that central banks might offset. The burden of dollar-
denominated debt repayment results in a tightening of global ﬁnancial
conditions when the U.S. dollar rises.
5.2. Response of global variables to structural shock to global interest rate
In the ﬁrst column of Fig. 4, a positive shock to global interest rates
leads to a statistically signiﬁcant and persistent decline in global M2.
Monetary tightening at global level is connected with reduced CPI and
nominal oil price, and after a positive bump to reduced global industrialTable 5
LR test.
Null hypothesis for LR test: no structural change






Dummy variable: 2008:M9 to data end 6 12.59 5.95
Dummy variable: 2008:M9 to 2008:M12 6 12.59 39.66***
Dummy variable: 2009:M1 to data end 6 12.59 2.14
Notes: The LR test is LR=(T−m)(ln|Σr|− ln|Σur|)~χ2(q), where: T is the number of ob-
servations,m is the number of parameters in eachequation of theunrestricted systemplus
contains, Σ is the determinant of the residual covariance matrix, and q is the number of
dummy variables times number of equations.
*** denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%.production. This is consistent with the ﬁnding by Hammoudeh et al.
(2015) within a structural VAR framework that increases in the federal
funds rate are associated with declines in energy prices. In the second
column of Fig. 4, a positive shock to global M2 is linked with increases
in CPI and nominal oil price, and after fourmonthswith increased global
industrial production.
5.3. Liquidity and structural shocks
The second column in Fig. 4 reports the effects on the global vari-
ables of a positive structural shock to liquidity. Global liquidity signiﬁ-
cantly impacts global CPI 3 and 4 months later. The impact on oil price
is statistically signiﬁcant after 3 months and remains so over the
20-month horizon. A positive innovation in global liquidity signiﬁcantly
impacts industrial production over a 5 to 13-month horizon. In linewith
results in the literature, increases in global liquidity are associated with
global expansion and rising oil and global consumer prices.
5.4. The oil price and structural shocks
The impulse responses of oil price to global variables are presented
in the ﬁfth row of Fig. 4. A negative shock to global interest rates and
positive shocks to global M2, to global CPI, and to global industrial pro-
duction, lead to statistically signiﬁcant and persistent increases in global
oil price (in the ﬁrst through fourth diagrams). A positive innovation in
M2 supports a higher level of spendingwith positive effects on nominal
oil price. A positive shock in the global CPI, reﬂects a negative shock to
the real price of oil and an increase in oil price. A positive innovation
in global industrial production indicates a higher level of global real ac-
tivity with concomitant increases in the demand for crude oil and an in-
crease in the global oil price.
In the ﬁfth column of Fig. 4, a positive innovation in oil price is asso-
ciatedwith a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on the global interest
Fig. 4. Cumulative impulse response function 1999:01 to 2013:12. Notes: Each row shows the cumulative impulse response of a variable to one-standarddeviation generalized innovations
in the global interest rate, global M2, global CPI, global industrial production, oil price, and the trade weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate, respectively. The variables being impacted in the
ﬁrst through sixth row are in descending order global interest rate, global M2, global CPI, global industrial production, oil price, and the trade weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate. The
impulse responses are obtained from the GFAVEC model in Eqs. (5), (6) and (7). The dashed lines represent a one standard error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the
coefﬁcients of the impulse response functions.
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ciation between oil price and global output may seem surprising. How-
ever, at the global level a rise in oil price has a distribution effect
between consumers and producers of oil as well as a positive effect on
the production of oil. The effect of a rise in oil price on global industrial
production depends on the overall effects on global consumption and
investment in reaction to a rise in the real price of oil.
Positive shocks to oil price have signiﬁcant effects on global M2 and
global CPI at impact only.20 A negative shock in oil price leads to a statis-
tically signiﬁcant increase in the trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar.
A rise in the price of oil is associated with the depreciation of the dollar
because the U.S. trade deﬁcit widens. This latter result is consistentwith
the ﬁnding by Aloui et al. (2013) that a rise in the price of oil is associat-
ed with the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.6. Robustness of results to alternative speciﬁcations
In this section, the robustness of results to changing the deﬁnition of
the global variables, to alternative identiﬁcation restrictions, and to dif-
ferent deﬁnitions of the principal components is examined.20 Valadkhani (2014) suggests that the relationship between oil price and the consumer
price index has changed over time (for Canada and the U.S.).6.1. G8 economies
We expand the analysis from the ﬁve largest economies to the eight
largest economies on GDP based on purchase power parity (PPP). This
means in constructing principal components for the interest rate, indus-
trial production and inﬂation we add data on these variables for Russia,
Brazil and the U.K. to those for the U.S., Euro area, Japan, China and
India. Our ﬁrst preference is to use data from the ﬁve largest economies
because these economies are much closer in size than the sixth, seventh
and eights economies (Russia, Brazil and the U.K.). Boivin and Ng (2006)
caution that expansion of the underlying data could result in factors that
are less helpful for forecasting when a useful factor in a small dataset be-
comes dominated in a larger dataset.21 However, the major developing
economies (taken to be the BRIC countries, Brazil, the Russian Federation,
India and China) have had dramatic increases in real income in recent
years and their inclusion along with the largest developed economies in
an analysis of global effects of oil prices is a reasonable robustness analy-
sis. The G8 economies account for around 70% of world GDP measure by
real PPP in U.S. dollars. The global measure of M2will now be the sum of
M2 in the largest eight economies in U.S. dollars.
It is found that global prices, global industrial production and global
monetary aggregate remain cointegrated with expansion to consider-
ation of the G8 economies. The LR test with data for the G8 economies21 Note that the risk of including economies of different sizesmay lead to the overrepre-
sentation (weights) of small economies when principal components are estimated.
Fig. 5. a. Responses of oil prices to global variables 1999:01 to 2013:12 (G8 economies). b. Responses of global variables to oil prices 1999:01 to 2013:12 (G8 economies). Notes: The ﬁrst
row in this ﬁgure shows the response of the oil prices to one-standard deviation generalized innovations in the global interest rate, global M2, global CPI, global industrial production, oil
price, and the trade weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate using data for the G8 economies. The second row in this ﬁgure shows the response the macro variables to one-standard deviation
generalized innovations in oil prices. The dashed lines represent a one standard error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the coefﬁcients of the impulse response functions.
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(chi-square value of 38.26) with a dummy variable from the period
2008:09 to 2008:12 to capture the global ﬁnancial crisis.
The GIRFs of oil price to global variables based on the eight largest
economies are presented in Fig. 5a. Key results are unchanged from
those obtained based on analysis of the ﬁve largest economies. Monetary
easing on a global scale is linked to rising oil prices. Positive innovations
in global M2, in global CPI, and in global industrial production, are associ-
ated with statistically signiﬁcant and persistent increases in global oil
price. The effect of global CPI on oil price is positive and statistically signif-
icant. TheGIRFs of global variables to positive shocks to oil price appear in
Fig. 5b. Themain result is similar for themodel for the eight largest econ-
omies to that obtained from the model for the ﬁve largest economies,
with a positive innovation in oil price being associated with statistically
signiﬁcant positive effects on the global ofﬁcial interest rate.22 The conﬁdence bands are obtained usingMonte Carlo integration as described by Sims
(1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR
coefﬁcient.
23 Note that contemporaneous coefﬁcients are generally statistically signiﬁcant at 10% in
both the systems in Eq. (5) and in Eq. (8).6.2. Structural identiﬁcation restrictions and estimates
In this sectionwe obtain impulse response function (IRF) results from
a model with identifying restrictions for the global economy that parallel
identifying restrictions made by Kim and Roubini (2000) for individual
advanced economies. We also compare the IRF results with the GIRF re-
sults. Similar restrictions are also used by Gordon and Leeper (1994),
Sims and Zha (2006b), Christiano et al. (1999) and Kim (2001). Dedola
and Lippi (2005) introduce a commodity price index rather than oil
price into the VARmodel. The contemporaneous impact ofmonetary pol-
icy shocks on industrial production and consumer prices is zero. Forni and
Gambetti (2010) refer to this as a standard identiﬁcation scheme.
In the Kim and Roubini (2000) model, the monetary policy feedback
rule does not allow monetary policy to respond within the month to
price level and industrial production events, but allows a contemporane-
ous response to bothmonetary aggregates andoil prices.Monetary aggre-
gate responds contemporaneously to the domestic interest rate, CPI and
industrial production, assuming that the real demand formoney depends
contemporaneously on the interest rate and real income. The CPI is inﬂu-
enced contemporaneously by both industrial production and oil prices,
while industrial production is assumed to be inﬂuenced by oil prices. Oil
prices are assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to all variables
in the model on the ground of information delay. Given the forward
looking nature of the exchange rate on asset prices and this variable'sinformation daily availability, the exchange rate is assumed to respond
contemporaneously to all variables in the model.
In line with this discussion of identifying restrictions based on Kim
and Roubini (2000), the matrix B0Xt in Eq. (5) is given by:
BoXt ¼
1 −b01 0 0 −b04 −b05
−b10 1 −b12 −b13 0 0
0 0 1 −b23 −b24 0
0 0 0 1 −b34 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
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Fig. 6 shows the responses of variables in theGFAVEC using the iden-
tifying restrictions in Eq. (8) to one-standard deviation structural inno-
vations. The dashed lines represent a one standard error conﬁdence
band around the estimates of the coefﬁcients of the (structural) IRFs.22
The estimates are for the G8 economies (results are virtually the same
for the G5 economies).23 In comparing cumulative impulse response re-
sults from the structural model in Eq. (8) with the generalized cumula-
tive impulse response functions in Fig. 4, we ﬁnd very few differences.
The main ﬁndings are unchanged. Positive innovations in global oil
price are linked to statistically signiﬁcant global interest rate tightening.
Positive innovations in globalmoney and industrial production are con-
nected with statistically signiﬁcant increases in oil prices. Positive inno-
vations in global interest rate are associatedwith statistically signiﬁcant
declines in oil prices, and positive shocks to the tradeweighted U.S. dol-
lar are linked with statistically signiﬁcant reductions in oil price.
6.3. Different weights in principal components
Our baselinemodel uses principal components with normalise load-
ings. In this sectionwe use principal componentswith normalise scores.
Results with principal components with normalise scores are very sim-
ilar to those for principal components with normalise loadings. The
Fig. 6.Cumulative impulse response functions forG8 variables 1999:01 to 2013:12. Notes: The cumulative impulse responses are obtained from theGFAVECmodel in Eq. (8) based on data
for theG8. Each row shows the cumulative impulse response of a variable to one-standarddeviation structural innovations in the global interest rate, globalM2, global CPI, global industrial
production, oil price, and the tradeweightedU.S. dollar exchange rate, respectively. The variables being impacted in the ﬁrst through sixth row are in descending order global interest rate,
globalM2, global CPI, global industrial production, oil price, and the tradeweightedU.S. dollar exchange rate. The cumulative impulse responses are obtained from theGFAVECmodelwith
identifying restrictions in Eq. (8). The dashed lines represent a one standard error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the coefﬁcients of the impulse response functions.
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principal components with normalise scores are shown in Fig. 7a, b.6.4. Statistical properties of the GFAVEC model
To test for autocorrelation, the residual serial correlation LM test is
estimated. Since the data utilized in this study are monthly, we use
twelve lags in the serial correlation LM test in the event that seasonality
effects are present. The results for this test for models speciﬁed in
Sections 4, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 suggest the absence of serial correlation. In
particular, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected
in the ﬁrst lag (at the 5% level).
Residual heteroskedasticity LM tests for all models are also estimat-
ed. It is found that the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity of the
joint combinations of all error term products cannot be rejected at the
5% level for all models. (For the residual serial correlation and the resid-
ual heteroskedasticity LM tests see Enders (2004; Chapter 5)).
An important condition to be satisﬁed in the VAR/VEC model is that
the lag structure included be stationary. This condition is investigated
by the inverse roots of AR characteristic test. For all models speciﬁed
in Sections 4, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the AR characteristic test shows that no
root lies outside the unit circle, suggesting that our models have stable
roots. (For the AR characteristic test see Enders (2004); p. 266)). All re-
sults in this section are available upon request from the authors.7. Conclusion
This paper proposes the use of a global factors augmented error cor-
rection model (GFAVEC) to examine the dynamic interaction of global
interest rates, global industrial production, and global CPI, and the
trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar with world oil prices. This
novel approach is used to identify shocks to these variables using GIRF
or structural shocks. Structural factors are constructed to capture infor-
mation provided by many variables (countries). Global factors are esti-
mated using principal component techniques applied to policy interest
rates, industrial production and CPI across countries. The collective
stance of monetary policy actions by major central banks is caught by
the level of global interest rates. A global factor is also estimated for
the global price of oil from the various leading oil price indices.
Global money, global industrial production and global prices are
cointegrated. Granger causality goes from global liquidity to oil prices
and from oil prices to the global interest rate, global industrial produc-
tion and global CPI. Monetary tightening indicated by positive innova-
tion in central bank discount rates results in signiﬁcant and sustained
decreases in oil prices. Positive shocks to global M2, to global CPI, and
to global industrial production, lead to statistically signiﬁcant and per-
sistent increases in global oil price. A negative innovation in the trade
weighted value of the U.S. dollar rate leads to statistically signiﬁcant
and persistent increase in global oil price in U.S. dollars. A rise in oil
price results in signiﬁcant increases in global interest rates. A positive
Fig. 7. a. Responses of oil prices to global variables 1999:01 to 2013:12 (normalise scores). b. Responses of global variables to oil prices 1999:01 to 2013:12 (normalise scores). Notes: The
ﬁrst row in this ﬁgure shows the generalized impulse responses of the oil price (to one-standard deviation innovations) using data with principal components constructedwith normalise
scores for the G5 economies. The second row in this ﬁgure shows and the response the macro variables to one-standard deviation generalized innovations in oil prices. The dashed lines
represent a one standard error conﬁdence band around the estimates of the coefﬁcients of the impulse response functions.
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weighted value of the U.S. dollar rate.
Granger causality tests from economy-level to global-level vari-
ables show that, for the period 1999–2013, the U.S. and China vari-
ables Granger cause the global variables, global interest rate, global
M2, global industrial production and global CPI. The Euro area vari-
ables Granger cause 3 out of 4 global variables (global interest rate,
global industrial production and global CPI), and India and Japan
Granger cause 2 out of 4 global variables (Japan's variables inﬂuence
global M2 and global industrial production while India's variables
inﬂuence global industrial production and global CPI). The results
indicate a degree of interdependence and inﬂuence between China
and the global economy that is somewhat similar to levels of inter-
dependence between the global economy and either the U.S. or Euro
area.
We emphasize that the paper examines the linear effects of an
oil price shock on global macroeconomic variables. A number of pa-
pers in the literature note that the interconnections between oil
prices and economic activity are more complicated. It is document-
ed that oil shocks may have an asymmetric impact on macroeco-
nomic variables and that nonlinearities in the connections may be
important. Previous empirical analyses have found that changes
in oil price volatility signiﬁcantly affect macroeconomic variables
(Ferderer, 1997; Lee et al., 1995). Unexpected oil price movements
can be associated with increased uncertainty about future oil prices
(Bernanke, 1983; Pindyck, 1991), leading ﬁrms to delay invest-
ments decisions. As a result, not only oil price increases but also
high oil price volatility is detrimental to economic growth with
complications for monetary policy. Future work should address
the implications of asymmetric, nonlinearities, and uncertainty in
the relationships between oil price shocks and global macroeco-
nomic variables.
The global ofﬁcial/policy interest rate set by central banks has
been shown to play a major role the dynamic interconnections
between world oil price shocks and global macroeconomic vari-
ables. Positive innovations in global oil price are associated with
increases in the global ofﬁcial/policy interest rate and positive
innovations in the latter are associated with decreases in global
oil price. When making decisions to shape the global economy, de-
cision makers at central banks should recognise that these links
exist even in the absence of formal policy coordination.Appendix A
A.1. Statistics on the principal components
Fig. A.1. contains a plot of the variance of the principal components
using normalise loadings for the interest rate, industrial production,
CPI and oil price. Each plot shows the variance accounted for by the
ﬁrst component and then for the second, third, etc., components for
each variable. In Tables A1 andA2,we report the percentage of total var-
iance explained by the ﬁrst, second and third principal components, for
the ﬁve largest and for the eight largest economies, respectively. For the
global CPI and global oil price, in particular, the ﬁrst principal compo-
nents capture nearly all of the information in the ﬁve economy-level
consumer price indices (88%) and the three oil price indices (99%).
The ﬁrst principal component for industrial productions (interest rate)
captures 60% (46%) of the news in the ﬁve economy-level interest
rates (industrial production). It is shown that for both groups of econo-
mies the percentage of total variance explained by the ﬁrst, second and
third principal components are very similar.
Alternative principal components can also be derived from the
Eqs. (1) through (4). These alternatives are: normalise loadings (where
the variance is equal to the estimated eigenvalues; normalise scores
(with unit variances with symmetric weights); and with equal weighted
scores and loadings. The representation for equal weighted scores and
loadings falls in between those for normalise loadings and normalise
scores. In the basicmodel constructing principal componentswe use nor-
malise loadings.A.2. Stationary properties of the data
In Tables A3 andA4 the stationary properties of the data are reported
for the country-speciﬁc variables and the global variables, respectively.
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–
Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) are estimated for all variables. The null hypothesis
for the ADF test is that the variable has a unit root and the null hypoth-
esis for the KPSS test is that the variable is stationary. Test results for the
interest rate are omitted in line with procedure in the literature (e.g.
Kim (2001); Kim and Roubini (2000) and Sims and Zha, 2006a,
2006b). The interest rate is generally used in levels since it is bounded
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monetary aggregate, consumer price index and industrial production
are for most cases only ﬁrst difference stationary. For China M2 the
ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (indicating
that the variable is second-different stationary) and the KPSS test does
reject the null hypothesis that this variable is only ﬁrst difference sta-
tionary (at conventional levels of conﬁdence). For China industrial pro-
duction, the ADF test indicates that this variable is ﬁrst different
stationary while the KPSS test cannot conﬁrm this result. To be consis-
tent with our estimations across countries we decided to work with
these variables in ﬁrst differences.
In testing the stationary properties of oil prices (the last 3 rows in
Table A3), results indicate that Dubai and Brent oil prices are only ﬁrst
difference stationary. For WTI oil prices results are less clear with the
ADF test indicating ﬁrst difference stationary and the KPSS test indicat-
ing only second difference stationary (results available upon request).
Following the literature and for comparison reasons, we decided to
use these variables in ﬁrst difference.
In Table A4, the ADF and KPSS tests indicate that the logs of global
M2, global consumer price index, global oil price, and trade weighted
U.S. dollar are ﬁrst difference stationary. The results for global industrial
production are ambiguous,with the KPSS test being consistentwithﬁrst
difference stationary, and the ADF test rejecting the null hypothesis of
unit root at 10% level of conﬁdence. For consistency with country-level
studies, we treat global industrial production as a ﬁrst difference sta-
tionary variable.
A.3. Global principal components estimation: G5 vs. G8 largest economies
In Fig. A2 the global variables created with principal components
for both the group of ﬁve largest economies and the group of eight
largest economies are plotted. For conciseness the group of ﬁve larg-
est economies is termed G5 and the group of eight largest economies
is termed G8. The global interest rate (ﬁrst principal component)
based on the G5 is slightly higher (lower) in the ﬁrst (second) half
of the sample than that based on the G8. However, the movements
in both G5 and G8 based global interest rates closely track one
another.
The global CPI based on data for the G8 has a steeper slope the global
CPI based on data for the G5. This is probably due to Brazil and Russia
both having had substantial increases in price levels (compared with
the other economies) over 1999–2013. Global industrial production,
given by the principal component for industrial production in the G8
has fewer steep recessions following 2001 (the recession in the U.S.)
and that following the global ﬁnancial crisis than indicated by the prin-
cipal component for industrial production in the G5. M2 for the G8
shows similar pattern to that for the G5.
Table A1
Variation explained by the ﬁrst, second and third principal components for each variable
for the ﬁve largest economies and for oil prices.1
2
1
2Interest rate Output CPI Oil pricesst principal component 44.5% 60.0% 89.6% 99.6%
nd principal component 21.7% 33.7% 9.0% 0.31%
st principal component 17.1% 4.2% 0.1% 0.01%3Notes: The ﬁve largest economies are the U.S., Euro area, China, Japan and India.
Table A2
Variation explained by ﬁrst, second and third principal components for each variable for
the eight largest economies.Interest rate Output CPIst principal component 46.1% 62.1% 90.1%
nd principal component 19.0% 33.1% 7.3%
st principal component 15.8% 2.4% 1.5%3Fig. A1. Scree plot (ordered eigenvalues) for global principal components.
Notes: The eight largest economies are the U.S., Euro area, China, Japan, India, the U.K.,
Russia and Brazil.Table A3
Test for unit roots 1999:1–2013:12: Domestic variables.
Null hypothesis for ADF test: the variable has a unit root.
Alternative hypothesis for ADF test: the variable has not a unit root.
Null hypothesis for KPSS test: variable is stationary.
Alternative hypothesis for KPSS test: variable is not stationary.Level ADF KPSS First difference ADF KPSSg (USM2t) 0.21 1.62*** Δlog (USM2t) −10.08*** 0.094
g (EAM2t) −0.49 1.54*** Δlog (EAM2t) −12.37*** 0.16
g (CHM2t) 0.37 1.62*** Δlog (CHM2t) −1.95 0.74
g (JM2t) −0.12 1.40*** Δlog (JM2t) −12.66*** 0.12
g (INM2t) −0.98 1.61*** Δlog (INM2t) −11.29*** 0.2
g (USCPIt) −1.08 1.63*** Δlog (USCPIt) −8.90*** 0.13
g (EACPIt) −0.41 1.63*** Δlog (EACPIt) −3.32** 0.24
g (CHCPIt) −0.17 1.55*** Δlog (CHCPIt) −2.58* 0.3
g (JCPIt) −2.25 0.94*** Δlog (JCPIt) −2.75* 0.1
g (INCPIt) 4.63 1.57*** Δlog (INCPIt) −2.58* 0.72*
g (USIPt) −2.42 0.40* Δlog (USIPt) −3.09** 0.07
g (EAIPt) −2.3 0.34* Δlog (EAIPt) −3.95*** 0.11
g (CHIPt) −2.52 1.61*** Δlog (CHIPt) −2.62* 1.11***
g (JIPt) −2.53 0.35* Δlog (JIPt) −10.35*** 0.06
g (INIPt) −0.75 1.62*** Δlog (INIPt) −18.03*** 0.15
g (OPDt) −2.19 1.54*** Δlog (OPDt) −9.52*** 0.08
g (OPWt) −2.43 1.48 Δlog (OPWt) −9.81*** 0.1
g (OPBt) −2.29 1.52*** Δlog (OPBt) −9.35*** 0.09loNotes: U.S., EA, J, CH and IN indicate the U.S., Euro area, China, Japan and India, respective-
ly.M2, CPI and IP indicateM2, consumer price index and industrial production, respective-
ly. OPD, OPW and OPB indicate Dubai, WTI and Brent oil price, respectively. The ﬁrst
difference of the series is indicated by Δ. The lag selection criteria for the ADF are based
on Schwarz information Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the Newey–West Bandwidth.
***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and 10% levels of signiﬁcance,
respectively.
Table A4
Test for unit roots 1999:1–2013:12: Global variables.
Null hypothesis for ADF test: the variable has a unit root.
Alternative hypothesis for ADF test: the variable has not a unit root.
Null hypothesis for KPSS test: variable is stationary.
Alternative hypothesis for KPSS test: variable is not stationary.Level ADF KPSS First difference ADF KPSSg (GM2t) 0.92 1.61*** Δlog (G3M2t) −12.90*** 0.24
g (GCPIt) −1.92 1.52*** Δlog (GCPIt) 1.00*** 0.73
g (GIPt) −2.94* 0.77*** Δlog (GIPt) −4.56*** 0.09
g (GOPt) −2.51 1.51*** Δlog (GOPt) −10.01*** 0.11
g (USTWIt) −0.99 1.41*** Δlog (USTWIt) −9.22*** 0.09loNotes: Variables are global M2 (GM2), global price level (GCPI), global industrial produc-
tion (GIP), global oil price (GOP), and global interest rate (GIR), and tradeweighted index
of theU.S. dollar (USTWI). Theﬁrst difference of a series is indicated byΔ. The lag selection
criteria for the ADF is based on Schwarz information Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the
Newey–West Bandwidth. ***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1, 5 and
10% levels of signiﬁcance, respectively.
Fig. A2. Global principal components estimation: G5 vs. G8 largest economies. Notes: The G5 consists of the U.S., Euro area, China, India, and Japan. The G8 consists of the G5 plus Brazil,
Russia and the U.K.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.06.002.
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